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Abstract 
Yoon et al. proposed a new efficient remote user authentication scheme using 
smart cards to solve the security problems of W. C. Ku and S. M. Chen’s 
scheme. This paper reviews Yoon et al.’s scheme and then proves that the 
password change phase of Yoon et al’s scheme is still insecure. This paper also 
proves that the Yoon et al. is still vulnerable to parallel session attack. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
To gain the access rights on an authentication server (AS), a password based remote 
user authentication schemes is used. The remote user makes a login request with the help 
of some secret information which are provided by the AS. On the other side the AS checks 
the validity of a login request made by a remote user U. In these schemes, the AS and the 
remote user U share a secret, which is often called as password. With the knowledge of 
this password, the remote user U uses it to create a valid login request to the AS.  AS 
checks the validity of the login request to provide the access rights to the user U. 
Password authentication schemes with smart cards have a long history in the remote user 
authentication environment. So far different types of password authentication schemes 
with smarts cards [3,4,5,6,12,13,14,18,20,21,22,23,26,31] have been proposed. 
In 1981, Lamport [17] proposed the first well-known remote password authentication 
scheme using smart cards. In Lamport’s scheme, the AS stores a password table at the 
server to check the validity of the login request made by the user. However, high hash 
overhead and the necessity for password resetting decrease the suitability and practical 
ability of Lamport’s scheme. In addition, the Lamport scheme is vulnerable to a small n 
attack [7]. Since then, many similar schemes [25,28] have been proposed. They all have a 
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common feature: a verification password table should be securely stored in the AS. 
Actually, this property is a disadvantage for the security point of view.  Keep in mind all 
the security requirements for a secure remote user authentication scheme,in 2002, Chien–
Jan–Tseng [13] introduced an efficient remote user authentication scheme using smart 
cards. In 2004, Ku and Chen [33] pointed out some attacks [7,30,32] on Chien – Jan and 
Tseng’s scheme. According to Ku and Chen, Chien et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to a 
reflection attack [7] and an insider attack [32]. Ku and Chen claimed that Chien et al.’s 
scheme is also not reparable [32]. In addition, they also proposed an improved scheme to 
prevent these attacks: reflection attack and an insider attack on Chien–Jan–Tseng’s 
scheme. In the same year, Hsu [10] pointed out that the Chien–Jan–Tseng’s scheme is 
still vulnerable to a parallel session attack and Yoon et al. [11] claimed that the password 
change phase of improved scheme of Chien–Jan–Tseng’s scheme is still insecure.  This 
paper proves that security vulnerabilities still exit in Yoon et al.’s scheme is still 
vulnerable to parallel session attack.  
Organization 
Section II reviews Yoon et al.’s scheme [11]. Section III is about our observations on 
the security vulnerabilities of Yoon et al.’s scheme. Finally, comes to a conclusion in  
section IV. 
II. YOON ET AL.’S SCHEME 
This section briefly describes Yoon et al.’s scheme [11]. This scheme has four phases: 
the registration phase, login phase, verification phase and the password change phase. All 
these four phases are described below. 
A. Registration Phase 
This phase is invoked whenever U initially or re-registers to AS. Let n denotes the 
number of times U re-registers to AS. The following steps are involved in this phase. 
 User U selects a random number b and computes PWS = f (b ⊕ PW) and submits 
her/his identity ID and PWS to the AS through a secure channel. 
 AS computes two secret numbers V =  f (EID ⊕ x) and  R = f (EID ⊕ x) ⊕ PWS, 
where EID = (ID║n) and creates an entry for the user U in his account database and 
stores n = 0 for initial registration, otherwise set n= n+1, and n denotes the present 
registration. 
Security Analysis of a Remote User Authentication Scheme with smart cards- Manoj Kumar 
 
 3 
 AS provides a smart card to the user U through a secure channel. The smart card 
contains two secret numbers V, R and a one-way function f. 
 User U enters her/his random number b into his smart card. 
B. Login Phase 
For login, the user U inserts her/his smart card to the smart card reader and then keys 
the identity and the password to gain access services. The smart card will perform the 
following operations:  
 Computes C1= R ⊕ f (b ⊕ PW) and C2 = f (C1 ⊕ TU). Here TU denotes the current 
date and time of the smart card reader. 
 Sends a login request C = (ID, C2, TU) to the AS. 
C. Verification Phase 
  Assume AS receives the message C at time TS, where TS  is the current date and time at 
AS. Then the AS takes the following actions: 
 If the identity ID and the time TU   is invalid i.e. TU =TS, then AS will rejects this 
login request. 
 Checks, if C2 
?
=  f (f (EID ⊕ x) ⊕ TU), then the AS accepts the login request and 
computes C3 = f (f (EID ⊕ x) ⊕ TS). Otherwise, the login request C will be rejected. 
 AS sends the pair TS and C3 to the user U for mutual authentication.  
 If the time TS is invalid i.e. TU =TS, then U terminates the session. Otherwise, U 
verifies the equation C3 
?
=  f (C1 ⊕ TS ) to authenticates AS. 
D. Password Change Phase 
This phase is invoked whenever U wants to change his password PW with a new one, 
say PWnew. This phase has the following steps. 
 U inserts her/his smart card to the smart card reader and then keys her/his identity 
and the old password PW and then requests to change the password.  
 U’s smart cards computes V* = R ⊕   f (b ⊕ PW). 
 Compare this calculated value V* with the secret value V, which is stored in the 
smart card of the user U. If they are equal, then U can select a new password 
PWnew, otherwise the smart card rejects the password change request. 
 U’s smart cards computes a new secret number Rnew = V*  ⊕ f (b ⊕ PWnew) and then 
replaces R with Rnew. 
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III. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF YOON ET AL.’S SCHEME   
Although, Ku and Chen’s scheme is modified by Yoon et al. [11] But, we analyze that 
Yoon et al.’ scheme is still not secure. This section discusses the security weaknesses of 
the Yoon et al.’s scheme. 
 A. Security Analysis of the Password Change Phase 
This section discusses the security weaknesses of the password change of Yoon et al.’s 
scheme. The discussion is divided into two subsections, which are described below. 
I. Security weaknesses in the Password Change Phase against the Outsiders 
Observe the password change phase of Yoon el al.’s scheme, to replace/change the old 
password PW with a new password PWnew, the user/performer should be in possession of 
the old password PW. The following section describes how any outsider /malicious user 
can recover the password PW first and then apply this peace of information to make for 
the success of her/his attack. 
It is clear that the smart card of a legal user U in Yoon et al.’s scheme contains: the 
secret value V, R, and a random number b and a public hash function f.  According to 
Kocher et al. [24] and Messerges et al. [31], for the security point of view, to store the 
secret information in smart cards is not a good practice. On the basis of these assumptions 
[24,31], an antagonist is able to breach the secrets V, R and b, which are stored in the 
smart card of the user and then he will be able to perform a password guessing attack to 
obtain the password. For the success of this attack, by using the breached secrets R and b 
the adversary will perform the following operations:  
• The antagonist intercepts the login request C = (ID, C2, TU) and guesses a 
password PW*. 
• Computes C1*= R ⊕ f (b ⊕ PW*) = f (ID ⊕ x)* and C2* = f (C1* ⊕ TU). 
•  Checks if C2* ?= C2, then the adversary has correctly guessed the password PW* 
= PW and C1* = C1. Otherwise, the adversary goes to step: 1. 
Once the adversary has correctly obtained C1, instantly, the password PW* 
corresponding to C1 will be the correct password and then successfully, he can change the 
password of the user U. Consequently, when the smart card was stolen, the antagonist is 
able to recover the password PW of the user and once the adversary has correctly obtain 
the password PW, then he will be able to destruct anything of his choice. Since our focus 
and aim is to show that the password change phase of Yoon et al.’s scheme, which is 
shown below that an authorized user ( antagonist) can easily replace the old password PW 
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by a new password of her/his choice. For the success, the antagonist applies the following 
actions. 
• Inters the smart card into the smart card reader, enters the identity ID and 
any password PW and then requests to change the password.  
• The smart card of the user computes V* = R ⊕   f (b ⊕ PW) and then 
compare the computed value V* with the stored value V. Obviously, both the 
value will be the same, because the adversary has entered the correct 
password. In this way, the smart card accepts the password change request. 
• Selects a new password PW*new and supplies it to the smart card reader and 
ultimately the smart card computes a new R*new = R ⊕ f (b ⊕ PW) ⊕ f (b ⊕ 
PW*new) and then replaces R with R*new. 
Thus, if the malicious user stole the user U’s smart card she/he will be able to make a 
destructive action of her/his choice. Thus, the adversary is able to change the password 
with a new password of his/his choice. Now the registered/ legal user U also will not be 
able to make a valid login request with her/his valid smart card because now the her/his 
old password  PW  will not work . 
II. Security weaknesses in the Password Change Phase against the Insider 
This subsection proves that the password change phase of Yoon et al.’s scheme is not 
secure against an antagonist insider at AS. In Yoon et al.’s scheme, observe the 
registration phase, the User U selects a random number b and computes PWS = f (b ⊕ 
PW) and submits her/his identity ID and PWS to the AS through a secure channel. It 
means the insider of AS is in possession of the number PWS = f (b ⊕ PW) for the legal 
user U. Again the AS computes two secret numbers V = f (EID ⊕ x) and R = f (EID ⊕ x) 
⊕ PWS, where EID = (ID║n). Thus, the insider of AS is also in possession of the secret 
numbers V and R for the legal user U. 
Suppose the user U is using the same password PW continuously, which is supplied by 
the AS at the time of registration, then the insider at AS  will be able to change the 
password PW  with a new password of her/his choice. If the smart card is in possession of 
an antagonist insider at AS for short time, then first, the insider inters the smart card into 
the smart card reader and can directly supply the value V to the smart card reader. Either, 
he directly supplies V or in place of f (b ⊕ PW), he supplies the value PWS without using 
the hash button.  Next, the antagonist insider enters a new password PW*new and then the 
smart card computes a new Rnew = R ⊕ f (b ⊕ PW) ⊕ f (b ⊕ PW*new) and then replaces R 
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with Rnew. Thus, if the malicious insider stole the user U’s smart card once, only for a 
small time and then he can replace the user’s password forever in such a way that the user 
U also will not be able to make a valid login request with her/his valid smart card because 
now the her/his old password PW will not work properly. As a result, the Yoon et al.’s 
password change phase is still insecure and that is under the threat of poor reparability.  
B. Parallel Session Attack on Yoon et al.’s Scheme   
Although, Yoon et al. [11] modified Ku and Chen’s scheme to remove its security 
weaknesses against parallel session attack. But, we analyze that the modified scheme of 
Yoon et al. is still vulnerable parallel session attack. This following subsection proves our 
claim that the modified scheme is still vulnerable a parallel session attack by an intruder. 
Since, a remote user password authentication is used to authenticate the legitimacy of 
the remote users over an insecure channel. Thus, an intruder Bob is able to intercept all 
the communication between the AS and user U and then from this intercepted 
information, he makes a valid login request to masquerade as a legal user. The intruder 
Bob applies the following steps for a successful parallel session attack on Yoon et al.’s 
scheme.   
 Intercepts the login request C = (ID, C2, TU) which is sent by a valid user U 
to AS. In this login request C, the time TU is the current time of the smart card 
reader, whenever the user U makes the login request. 
 Intercepts the response message (C3, TS), which is sent by AS to he user U. In 
this response message, the time TS in the current time at the AS, when AS 
receives the login request C. 
 Starts a new session with the AS by sending a fabricated login request Cf = 
(ID, C3, TS).  
Upon, receiving the fabricated login request Cf = (ID, C3, TS), at time TS*, where TS* is the 
current date and time at AS. The AS performs the following steps to ensure the validity of 
the received login request. 
 Checks the validity of the format of the identity ID and the time TU i.e. 
TS* ≠ TS. Both these conditions hold true, because the intruder has been used 
a previously registered identity ID and obviously the time TS* will be 
different from the time TS.  
 Checks, the verification equation C3 
?
=  f (f (EID ⊕ x) ⊕ TS), which is also 
holds truly. The logic behind the successful verification of this phase is very 
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interesting. If we observe login and verification phase of Yoon et al.’s 
scheme, then it makes a sense that the second part C2 of the login request C = 
(ID, C2, TU) and the first part C3 of the response message (C3, TS) are 
computed by the same procedure and with similar information.  
 AS sends the pair TS and C3 to the user U for mutual authentication.  
 If the time TS is invalid i.e. TU = TS, then U terminates the session. Otherwise, 
U verifies the equation C3 
?
=  f (C1 ⊕ TS) to authenticate AS. 
 Finally, AS computes C4 = f (f (EID ⊕ x) ⊕ T*S) and responses with the 
message pair (C4, T*S) to the user U for mutual authentication, where T*S is 
the current timestamp of the AS. Thus, the intruder intercepts and drops this 
message  
In this way, the fabricated login request Cf = (ID, C3, TS), which is made by the 
intruder, satisfies the all the requirements for a successful authentication of the intruder 
Bob by the AS.  
IV. CONCLUSION  
As, we have observed that Yoon et al. just consider the security problems in the 
password change phase of Ku and Chen’s scheme and repaired that phase only.  They 
again presented a modified scheme with same security parameters as it was with previous 
scheme. This paper analyzed that security weaknesses still exist in Yoon et al.’s scheme. 
The password change phase is still vulnerable to security attacks by an outsider as well as 
an antagonist insider at AS. On the other side, Yoon et al.’s scheme is still vulnerable to 
the parallel session attack. Thus, the security pitfalls are still exists in Yoon et al.’s 
scheme. 
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